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The Great Khmer Empire, today known as Cambodia, made a great leap of its 
civilization from the 9thcentury to the 15th century, a regime that established 
masterpiece of constructions across Cambodia and some parts of its neighboring 
countries, unique cultural influences and a hub of regional trade. Such a great 
civilization, however, did not last long and the question remains unanswered why the 
Great Khmer Empire declined so dramatically.  
 
In the last three decades, Cambodia has still greatly suffered in deep conflicts, social 
fragmentation and political turmoil resulting from competing political influences of 
super-power countries and its own extreme pure society ideology – the Khmer Rouge. 
Recovering from those nightmares, Cambodia is now enjoying great political stability 
comparing to her neighbors, has integrated itself into regional and international 
communities; and steps forward toward economic development with GPD growth of 7 
percent annually (World Bank, 2015). 
 
Although the country is now on the right path, there are many regional issues and 
Cambodia has yet to secure its role in Southeast Asia. The South China Sea Issue 
remains a fundamental issue that recently has divided the unity of ASEAN, which 
failed to issue a join communiqué for the first time in its 47 year history. In addition to 




2002 during Cambodia’s Chair of ASEAN Summit and the Declaration of Conduct 
(DOC), a milestone promoting regional stability and peace, during its chair of ASEAN 
Summit in 2012 remains in limbo resulting from poor cooperation and the unwilling of 
concern parties to reduce their differences. Again the ASEAN Summit in Laos 2016, 
Cambodia is accused of being bought by China for its stand opposing strong language 
in the join-communiqué condemning China military activities and urge the immediate 
implementation of the court verdict which favored the Philippine, decades closed U.S. 
ally and supportive strategic partnership of U.S. Pivot Policy towards Asia. These 
differences have led to the suggestion of “Cambodia Exit” from ASEAN, claiming it’s 
the only one that opposes the ASEAN Unity, but others questions if ASEAN is created 
to serve the interest of the only big and powerhouse ASEAN Member States? Other 
questions what ASEAN contribute to Cambodia or its ASEAN Member States and 
what is the worth of staying? With no conflict of interest over the pool of territory 
disputes, Cambodia has been given a significant opportunity to test its ability 
promoting its minimizing any damages to regional peace and stability, but hasn’t 
produced any remarkable achievement so far. These suggest the research to focus on its 
foreign policy and to what extend it can pursue interest and role in regards to the South 
China Sea Issue. 
 
This paper examines Cambodia’s foreign policy and its stand, the opportunities and 
challenges that could navigate both regional and global political environment to fulfill 
its national interests. Also, it seeks to explain the importance of its initiative effort in 
regional issues – the South China Sea – to influence its policies and maintain its 
position based on its principle of neutrality and non-alliance, and at the same promote 
regional peace and stability. The study then hypothesizes the implications and 
challenges of Cambodia’s foreign policy within degree of its capacity to maximum 
interests Cambodian can pursue responding to the South China Sea Issue and today 
political challenging context.  
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a. Logic of dissertation 
Before discussing about Cambodia’s position in South China Sea Issue, there is a 
necessary to brief about Cambodian foreign policy which started from its post 
independent from the French Protectorate in 1953 after campaigns across the country 
leading by a young King, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. After receiving the independent 
from the French Protectorate which that time colonized part of Indochina, including 
Laos and Vietnam, in 1955s Prince Norodom Sihanouk had abdicated, placed his 
father King Norodom Suramarit on the throne and officially enter politics at the head 
of his own political party, which would give its name to that era in Cambodia: the 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum, or People’s Socialist Community, the golden era in modern 
Cambodia and during his leadership Cambodia was considered as the hub of Asia 
ranging from stylish Khmer architects; very first healthcare service in the region, 
entertainment and arts; and quality education, but sadly this golden area won’t last long. 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk had tried to maintain the neutrality of Cambodia from the 
competing power of the two super power countries – the Soviet Union and the United 
States. When the U.S. backing South Vietnam and waged war with North Vietnam, 
Cambodia was in hot spot and urged to choose side, but again Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk still maintain his neutrality, but secretly helping supply North Vietnamese 
soldiers in an exchange for financial assistance when country facing serious financial 
crisis and budget deficit. Cambodia’s neutrality during that time was shaking in 
between of the shifting world order and turmoil, including the rebel known as Khmer 
Rouge backed by Vietnam; and later in 1970 Prince Norodom Sihanouk was removed 
from the power; and the new republic government was formed leading by Prince’s 





The Vietnam War was escalating to Cambodia’s doorstep leading to carpet bombing of 
American on Cambodia from early of 1969s to late 1973s killing more than a half of 
million Cambodian people and bombed Cambodia to the ground twice more than it 
dropped on Japan in World War II. The carpet bombing targeting Viet Cong soldiers, 
but killed only innocent Cambodian people leading to massive migration into the city, 
including growing anger against the Americans. The Khmer Rouge rebels supported by 
the Vietnamese started its propaganda exploiting the situation by using the name of the 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk calling people into forests in order to kick out the American 
soldiers and its puppet regime – the Republic of Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk who was 
on self-exiled in China endorsed the Khmer Rouge campaign without expecting any 
worse case scenario, and fruitfully the Khmer Rouge marched to Phnom Penh in 1975 
eliminating all Lon Nol’s soldiers and called for an immediate people evacuation from 
Phnom Penh warning U.S. b-52 bombers  approaching. After taking full control of the 
country, many scholars and diplomats were called back home to rebuilt the country, 
but end up in secret executions upon their return while the Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
and his families were locked up in his palace in Phnom Penh for months before 
escaping to China. 
 
The Khmer Rouge was considering the disaster in modern Cambodia after its decline – 
the Great Khmer Empire – since late 15th century. About 2 million Cambodian lives 
lost resulting from execution, starvation, forced labor and illness while country’s 
economy ranked zero beside only producing rice milk and with little open to the world. 
The regime which once was supported by Vietnam turned to side with China and 
regard Vietnam as its target of elimination after its own Khmer people. The regime 
came to an end when it wage war with Vietnam in 1979 and in January 7, 1979 
Vietnam armies invaded Cambodia pushing the Khmer Rouge soldiers to the retreat 
next to Cambodian-Thai border. The Khmer Rouge and the proxy wars were put to bed 
when the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) organized the 




Though Eastern part of the country remained to be the strong hold of Pol Pot’s soldiers, 
but the light of coming to power was impossible until itself failed to survive in late 
1997 when Cambodia’s government implemented reconciliation policy allowing Pol 
Pot’s soldiers into the country’s defense forces without any punishment, except its top 
leaders.  
 
Almost half a century later, Cambodia itself is still struggling to find its own way of 
international community recognition in the shifting world order and steps forward the 
progressive path and advance itself into a prosperous nation. The vulnerable 
geopolitics and the  running up for political influence by the superpower countries are 
also the fact contributed to Cambodia’s great suffer since its pre-independent when 
both Japanese and French armies fighting over the administration on Cambodia. Those 
suffers is likely the lesson learnt for Cambodian elite to carefully choosing side for its 
surviving from the containing of both sifting of world order and its neighbors – 
Thailand and Vietnam. These also, as a matter of principle, shape the foreign policy of 
Cambodia especially its neutrality which is also stated in the Constitution denouncing 
taking side or allowing foreign military bases on its territory.  
 
After the political turmoil and proxy wars were put to rest, Cambodia kicked of its 
actively bidding for the membership in the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), but sadly rejected and blocked by some of ASEAN founding members for 
years claiming Cambodia has no shared value. It eventually granted the membership in 
ASEAN in 30th April 1999 after spending years as Observer State. Cambodia then open 
up a new chapter and its new face to the world ranging from foreign direct investment 
and connectivity to tourist destination in the region with its golden era legacy of the 
Great Khmer Empire – the Angkor Wat Archeological site.  
 
The ASEAN block presents Cambodia with great opportunities and also an 




great connectivity and shared economic interest, Cambodia is eager to find itself a 
place to prosper and live on its feet. ASEAN Way – none interference policy – also an 
icon attraction not only for Cambodia, but also other Asian countries to bid for the 
membership since it will give each ASEAN Member State a full control and 
sovereignty over their respective country, to name a few.  
 
Yet again the nightmare is more than the shadow haunting all around when the then 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clintons publicly U.S. shifting its interest – the 
American Pivot to Asia – to Asia, the South China Sea issue is emerging and 
escalating amid tension between ASEAN Member States that benefits economic and 
investments from China; and those that strategically and economically benefited from 
the United States. Until 2012, when Cambodia was the Chair and hosted the ASEAN 
Submit in Phnom Penh, the join communiqué was failed to issue for the 47 years of 
history when the Philippines and Vietnam – the hardliner and the two of out the four 
dispute parties in the South China Sea – strongly demanded to include the South China 
Sea. Cambodia was labeled as the Chinese puppet acting in the interest of China and 
has been trying to divide ASEAN, including the recalling diplomat from the Philippine 
after both countries officials exchanged series of pieces on newspapers accusing each 
other of playing dirty politic placing national interest above association concern. The 
tension within ASEAN Member States remains its heat until Cambodia initiated the 
Code of Conduct (COC) to supplement the failure of the join communiqué, a move and 
a please that hardly be satisfied.  
 
Since the very beginning, Cambodia expressed her strong position over the South 
China Sea by bearing its neutral foreign policy and ASEAN none-interference 
principle; and has been urging dispute parties to deal the issue bilaterally for the sake 
of regional peace and stability. Cambodia is likely reluctant to involve itself into the 
issue viewing it as not an issue between ASEAN and China, a clear picture of its 




issue is spreading when disputed parties Navy Vassals speed up into the disputed water, 
including protests of activists and fishermen of each dispute party. The Philippine, with 
the courage of the United States, brought the case to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) suing China over its claiming of grabbing offshore, an area believed rich in oil 
and resources worth billions of dollars. Recently, the court ruled in the favor of the 
Philippine while China blasted the court of binding no legal jurisdiction over the issue; 
and will never comply with the verdict. The United States again has been urging China 
to act in line with the court decision, especially the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLO) which the U.S. itself has never ratified it causing another 
diplomatic tension between China and the United States. With the courage of its 
historically ally and military muscle supplier, the Philippine take another sharp 
position demanding the endorsement of the court decision in the join communiqué 
which is recently hosted by Laos as a Chair, but unsurprisingly objected. Cambodia is 
again in the center of the hot spot ranging from accusation of being the Chinese puppet 
to the proposed of Camexit, referring to the exit of the Great British from the European 
Union recently – a contrary and double standards to the  case brought by Cambodia 
when the invaded Thai soldiers stormed its PreahVihear Temple which ASEAN, 
including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the United States urged 
Cambodia to deal with Thailand bilaterally for the sake of regional peace and stability.  
 
The difficulties and the need of foreign aids and investment to prosper its nation is 
likely the factor of Cambodia’s strong position maintaining good relationship with 
Chinese, its biggest trade partners and aids while other ASEAN Member States enjoy 
the same benefits both economically and military, but face no accusations. Despite 
growing tension and accusation against Cambodia as the puppet or agent of China to 
break the unity of ASEAN, the question remains whether ASEAN is formed just to 
serve the interest of the powerhouse ASEAN Member States? If the possibility of 
Camexit resulting from its growing pressure and disagreement over involving ASEAN 




other ASEAN Member States’ economic well-being so far? Since when has ASEAN 
Unity been unified or double standard of ASEAN None-Interference Principle applied? 
How much Cambodia’s neutral position over the South China Sea is likely to hurt 
ASEAN as a whole? This paper seeks to answer those questions and enable readers to 
see issues in a bigger picture.  
b. Research Questions 
For the scope limitation to write this research paper, two main questions will be 
focused on:  
1. What is the attitude of Cambodia’s foreign policy toward the South China Sea 
Issue?  
2. How necessary of its strategic cooperation and neutrality principle will promote 
Cambodia’s interest and role in the ASEAN concerning the South China Sea Is
sue? Will this principle, at the same time, rebalance its diplomatic relation bet
ween the rising China and U.S.?  
Interview Questions 
1. What is Cambodia’s position responding to South China Sea issue? To what ex
tend can Cambodia, as a member of ASEAN, promotes its role in this issue, by
 maintaining ASEAN Unity?  
2. In 2022, Cambodia will be again the chair of ASEAN Submit. If South China 
Sea issue is escalating, what approach or mechanism Cambodia will consider 
to cold down the issue?  
3. Both U.S. and China are the major donors and investment of Cambodia.  
How Cambodia rebalance the relationship with these two superpower countries? 
 
c. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
This particular study therefore attempt to provide an in-depth understanding on the 
implication of Cambodia’s foreign policy and its stand responding to the South China 




emerging of regional issues ranging from territory disputes and refugees to climate 
change. It uses realist and liberalism paradigm to articulate Cambodia’s foreign 
policies and the events that could produce significant impacts based on its interests 
promoting its influence and role in the region and international communities.  
 
The study seeks to explain how Cambodia can broader its approach to secure its 
interest and role in the emerging of regional issues like South China Sea issue and 
cross border issues while can still maintain its neutrality and non-interference principle. 
Most importantly, it also seeks to give analysis assessment of how the necessity of its 
strategic cooperation with the Asian giant – China– while rebalancing its diplomatic 
relation with the United States ensuring both its interest and good cooperation with the 
two superpower countries.  
 
The methodology used for this paper consists of desktop research, literature reviews, 
government and academic publication and digital documents. Also, it will include 
precise interview session with Cambodian policy-makers and researchers regarding 





II. Cambodia and ASEAN 
 
a. Literature Review 
 
The emerge of global and regional issues ranging from civil wars to refugees, including 
military confrontation over sovereignty claimed, have present great challenges to world 
leaders over their political willing and commitment to cold down the issues and 
provide the peaceful resolutions. South China Sea issue, for example, is one of the 
most rising issues in Asia after the power declined U.S. shifted its foreign policy 
concern – the U.S. Pivot Policy towards Asia – to encounter the rising power of China. 
Records of military confrontation and provocation have been reported between China 
and other claimant states and yet still no common agreement is reached. There is active 
involvement, although, of regional block – ASEAN – and series of agreement on the 
issues have been produced so far like the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) 
which initiated in 2002 during Cambodia Chair of ASEAN Submit and the Declaration 
of Conduct (DOC), a milestone to promote regional peace and stability, during its chair 
of ASEAN Submit in 2012, but still cannot convince the claimant states to reduce their 
differences and work together for the mutual interest and regional peace.  
The potential conflicts and the tension over the South China Sea has originally arisen 
from a complex series of overlapping claim over islands and water that rich in oil, 
natural gas and the freedom of navigation. In 1995, the study made by Russian’s 
Research of Geology of Foreign Countries estimated that the equivalent of 6 billion 
barrels of oil and natural gas might be located in the Spratly Island, a claimed island 
between China and Vietnam. Similarity, the Pan Shiying of the Foundation for 
International and Strategic Studies in Beijing estimated that oil and natural gas reserves 
in the Spratly islands account to 17.7 billion tons which ranks fourth in the world after 
Kuwait. The U.S. Geological Survey also estimated that about 60 to 70 percent1 of the 
regions ‘hydrocarbon resources are gas making that surrounding area the lifetime of 
                                                        





each claimant states and shows no sight to back off. The Philippines has a similar 
interest and position to Vietnam for its economic development and interest; and with 
the backup of the U.S., the tension increases and each party claims to own that 
sovereignty regardless of negotiation and peaceful resolutions. The control of the 
Spratly and other areas in the South China Sea is vital for claimants’ economic 
interests which matches to the Realist Theory which claims the conflicts arises from 
struggling to expand for larger land and resources for the need of the country or in 
other word, the economics is the root of claimants ’extreme and aggressive stand which 
is the most divided issue of the conflict (Phanna 2012).  
 
As a matter of fact, the relationship between China and ASEAN has been doing pretty 
well in terms of economic cooperation despite territorial dispute and military tension 
with some of ASEAN Member States – Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippine. Yet China is 
growing political and economic domination over these countries as the result of 
American’s switching its policy focused to Asia since 2011. ASEAN, however, 
maintain its crucial role in maintaining regional stability by addressing peaceful 
resolution rather than dealing the issues with military forces. The conflict emerges as 
the result of power shifting between China and the United State leading to arm race in 
ASEAN as each country is increasing double its national budget spending. These 
present great challenges to deal the South China Sea issue peacefully and based on 
ASEAN Way(SOCHEAT 2014).  
 
As a matter of fact, ASEAN has no military option either; and almost no any of 
ASEAN Member States are willing to risk hostilities with China, not to mention any 
possible economic sanctions or other means of punishment. As the result, instead of 
issuing a join-communiqué with pretty strong language expressing its serious concern, 
the join-communiqué urges involvement parties to deal the issues peacefully through 
ASEAN and international mechanism and avoid taking any provocation that 




likely believed that the South China Sea is at its far beyond the sovereignty and nature 
of law. According to some experts, there are two possible sets of law to contend with 
this hot issue. The first one is an older form governs an easy known as “historical 
claims”, to territory and the second form is the newer form which were defined by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), stated its legitimate 
governs any form of maritime claims that can be measured from territorial claims. 
These two sets of law perhaps don’t land as expected or simply saying won’t help 
much in dealing the issue. ASEAN cannot agree on anything or even what was stated 
in this law because Member State has its own definition and different perspective; and 
the decision must be the consensus. It’s all national interests and pursues their national 
interest first before regional influence and interests. Very few members are willing 
place regional interests above their national interest, but others remain as shadow while 
elite of each ASEAN Member States, except Vietnam, Laos and Brunei is subjected to 
be elected every four years term. The Chinese is likely understand ASEAN’s weakness 
pretty well and have being working so hard to minimize any possible combined 
ASEAN activity on the disputes area. Some ASEAN Member States see no interest in 
the issue, few obligations to the concern countries and enjoy the benefits of Chinese 
trade and investment.  ASEAN has never been united as the result of national interest 
and geopolitical priority (HAYTON 2014). 
The issue has remarkably testing the unity of the ASEAN Member States, but sadly it 
has divided its members into different groups based on their interest and foreign policy 
principle. In 2012 of ASEAN Submit in Phnom Penh, hosted by Cambodia, ASEAN 
Member States failed to issue a join-communiqué for the first time in its history over 
their stand on the South China Sea Issue causing diplomatic tension between the Chair 
Cambodia and the other two members – the Philippine and Vietnam. Cambodia was 
painted and made headline in local and international medias for its poor leadership and 
bias toward its major aid and economic partner – China – forcing it to replace the 
Ambassador to the Philippine before the term ended; and also exchanged sharp 




Cambodia was also accused of blocking the statement strongly express concern over 
the escalation and the development of issues especially over the court rule in the favor 
of the Philippine in regards to the South China Sea issue; hours later the Prime 
Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, singed the unconditioned aid of 600 million dollars 
from China making the accuse seems more rational and logic, but the Royal 
Government of Cambodia still maintains its position and suggest the peaceful 
mechanism following the existing principle and resolution of ASEAN – COC and 
DOC.  
 
Defending his foreign policy assertion, Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen, announced 
that; “Cambodia has, again and again, became a victim of the South China Sea issue 
because of the unjust accusations.” He continued, “The Phnom Penh Fiasco’ – the 
failure to issue the joined communiqué – took place not because of Cambodia, but 
because they bullied Cambodia, referring to pressure from ASEAN claimant states – 
the Philippines and Vietnam – to incorporate their strong wordings in the joint 
communiqué. The Premier maintained that, “ASEAN is not a court. ASEAN cannot 
measure land for them… the South China Sea is not an issue between ASEAN and 
China…”2 
 
Diplomatic stalemates between ASEAN and China as well as within ASEAN further 
exacerbate the uncertainty. The South China Sea has become what the Economist 
names a “sea of troubles”. China’s growing assertiveness has resulted in numerous 
confrontations within ASEAN claimant states, including military standoff with 
Vietnam and Philippine. Many explanations have been suggested to the China’s 
military and diplomatic posture on the South China Sea. Donald Emmerson, for 
instance, suggests that China’s increasing assertiveness derives from three fears and 
one project. These are fears of (1) the repetition of humiliation that China suffered 
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throughout the 19th century by Western powers – Britain, France, and the U.S. entered 
China by crossing the South China Sea. The second is an attempt by external power, 
the U.S. in particular, to contain the rise of China which Beijing considers to be the 
country’s righteous position in the world; and of course (3) the disaffection of the 
Chinese population over Beijing’s handling of territorial integrity like Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, to name a few. Beside its fear, it’s its project, the dream to establish a new 
Middle Kingdom and this hypothesis is rational when President Xi Jinping declared the 
“Chinese Dream” when he came to power in November 2012. Additionally, the 
American “pivot to Asia” also the factor contributed to such growing assertiveness in 
the region. At the ASEAN Regional Forum hosted by Vietnam in 2010, for example, 
The United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton blasted Chinese military 
movement in the South China Sea and declared publicly the U.S. national interest in 
terms of freedom of navigation and flight in the South China Sea rising military 
tension between China and disputed countries; the Philippines and Vietnam have also 
been more assertive both in their bilateral negotiation with China and in using ASEAN 
as a regional bloc to pressure China. Cambodia’s position on the South China Sea is 
(1) principally to continue the implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC); (2) encouraging ASEAN and China to make 
utmost effort finalizing the Code of Conducts (COC), (3) and enable the concern 
countries to solve the issue peacefully (Chanborey 2016).  
 
These become the hot debate among policy-makers over the membership of Cambodia 
and the suggestion is simply the exit of Cambodia from ASEAN, a proposed that didn’t 
state in the ASEAN Charter or simply concern if ASEAN was created just to serve the 
interest of the powerhouse countries. These issues and challenges make it worth to 
study and at the same time will enable readers to further understand the root cause of 
issues and potential narrative solutions; especially the position of Cambodia and its 
foreign policy towards South China Sea issue. In addition to that, it will give the 




they will be facing – climate change, cross border issues, hydro dam projects, and 
human rights. The study will substantially contribute to further research over the issue 
and lesson learnt that will enable us to see the issue and possible solution in a bigger 
picture.  
b. ASEAN Charter: Non-Interference Principle 
The association (ASEAN) was created in 1967 aiming to form a bloc dealing with a 
variety of common interests ranging from trades, cultures and cross border issues. 
Some scholars positively believe that the nature of ASEAN’s Way is at first and 
foremost rooted in the principle of Non-Interference Principal in domestic affairs of its 
ASEAN Member States (JONES 2010). ASEAN Non-Interference Policy, it can be 
assumed that, is the principal of conducting mutual states relations which has 
significantly contributed to today regional peace and stability. Principally and 
practically, ASEAN Member States are not encouraged to interfere in any of its 
Member State’s internal affairs or even supporting political movement in its 
neighboring countries3. The Non-Interference Principle appears, however, increasingly 
undermined through the expanded of ASEAN memberships, including challenges of 
globalization, the demand for democracy are increasing, and the increasing pressure of 
international community and international norm which practically focus on human 
security more than on state-sovereignty 4  or international security arena. In an 
increasingly interconnected world, ASEAN appears to be an emerge providing 
significant regional player on the international stage. Following its Non-Interference 
Policy, the association’s conduct has at some point pressuring the issues in compliance 
to regional as well as global concern (STUBBS 2008).  
The debate about ASEAN finds no time for a small break while its principle has in fact 
never been compulsory. ASEAN’s function as a guiding light is especially 
                                                        
3DOSCH, J., “ASEAN’s reluctant liberal turn and the thorny road to democracy promotion”, The Pacific 
Review: 2008, pg.527-545. 
4 JETSCHKE, A. and J. RULAND, “Decoupling Rhetoric and Practice: the cultural limits of ASEAN 




compromised in recent years through the adoption of a new policy of ‘flexible 
engagement and non-interference policy’ and a more assertive stance on human rights 
related issues and religious conflicts. “In the sense that public criticism of other states’ 
domestic affairs has become a frequent practice and a gradual shift toward 
humanitarian interventionism is taking place, ASEAN has moved beyond its non-
interference policy as interpreted in the original way, but a looser version of the non-
interference principle has continued to be an important restraint on ASEAN’s conduct 
in regional affairs. The original participating member-states include Thailand, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. Rather than creating a military 
bloc like NATO does, these ASEAN Member States set out to establish a normative 
framework based on the principle of non-interference in order to prevent unwanted 
foreign intervention in the members-states’ domestic affairs”(DAVISON, and J. 
DOSCH Eds. 2009).“Founded during the Cold War, ASEAN’s primary aim was to 
prevent the region’s involvement in the great power rivalry between East and West5. 
Practically, the sovereignty norm was reinforced by a decision-making approach based 
on consultation and consensus, and a focus on the peaceful resolution of inter-state 
disputes. Southeast Asian regionalism thus served to prevent foreign interference and 
enabled the member-states to focus primarily on internal affairs. ASEAN was not 
designed to develop into a supranational institutional body, but rather as a forum for 
constructive dialogue among its member-states”6. In 1999, other five countries namely 
Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia had joined the association in addition 
to the five original member states. 
The original non-interference, but flexible engagement policy has become a wall to  
block ASEAN’s capacity to solve the region’s internal issue and external problems 
rather than military bloc, but a pool of sharing interest and common norm between the 
powerhouse and impoverished member states. The principle of non-interference is, 
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without a doubt or question, the original core foundation upon which regional relations 
between ASEAN Member-States are based, according to Keling. The principle was 
first lined out in ASEAN’s foundation document, the Bangkok Declaration, issued in 
1967 Bangkok Declaration expressing that ASEAN Member-States are determined to 
prevent external interference in order to ensure domestic and regional stability, a move 
which has both positive and negative effects. After the declaration in Bangkok, the 
policy was again discussed in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1997. “It was further 
reinforced in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), in 
which the principle of non-interference in members’ internal affairs was explicitly 
referred to as one of the association’s fundamental principles”7. 
ASEAN is viewed, by large, as the talk shop rather than an influential bloc as the result 
of its Non-Interference Principle. The concrete explanation, however, why ASEAN 
chose the non-interference principle, rarely made and we first need to understand its 
geopolitical suffer over the competition of the imperialist countries. There are two, if 
not many, political factors have been critical in the development of ASEAN’s 
normative framework or “ASEAN Way”, and these factors are important for an 
understanding of why ASEAN has used the non-interference principle as its resolution 
preference involving disputes. The first factor is the particular importance attached to 
state-sovereignty by ASEAN Member States as the result of their geopolitical 
disadvantages. Colonial rule, Cold War experiences and frequent attempts by China to 
export communism all reinforced internal conflict and led the Southeast Asian8 to 
perceive sovereignty as a key element in ensuring regional as well as domestic stability, 
not to mention the U.S. carpet bombing Cambodia and Laos to the grown without the 
acknowledge of the international community, particularly the United Nations and its 
organs. “The second factor is the priority assigned to preserving domestic stability as 
internal security matters are considered to be of fundamental importance. This factor 
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stems from the countries’ fragility of the social and political order, which has made the 
domestic field their main security focus.”   
In principal and practical, it’s an extensive consensus among policymakers and 
observers on the longstanding importance of the Non-Interference Principle of ASEAN 
in its involvement in its member states; the principle has never been absolute. In the 
pie of the theory and practice of ASEAN’s Non-Interference Policy, some opposed 
ASEAN’s principle in its member states affairs claiming the principle is inconsistent 
with the application of the policy and views the policy is a tool to legitimate state-
behaviors and political elites9 rather than the interest of the bloc and its citizens. Some 
went on giving an example of the Cold War which experienced ASEAN interventions 
to contain radical communist movement that threaten the capitalist social order within 
ASEAN itself. 
When the Cold War came to an end, new capitalist system started to emerge and free 
flow of investment and trade opportunities between countries and countries are at full 
speed. Still the manifold violations of ASEAN Member States, but despite it the Non-
Interference Principle has nevertheless effects on ASEAN’s Way of regional affairs 
and internal stability has always been given top priority As a matter of fact, ASEAN’s 
political willingness presents the reluctance to interfere in its member states affairs, an 
approach that has been greatly influenced by a concern of preventing interference in its 
internal affairs.  
The significant test on the Non-Interference Principle was the notable ASEAN’s 
opposing stance when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to topple the Khmer Rouge 
regime in its genocidal campaign against its own people. At that time, ASEAN formed 
international protest against Vietnam’s invasion Cambodia. It’s, therefore, it’s 
                                                        




inconsistent with the Non-Interference Principle that discourage the intervention in 
internal affairs of its member states. 
 Aside from its collective mechanism, the principle of non-interference also present 
great negative impact to the effectiveness of ASEAN framework and sometimes cause 
tension among ASEAN Member States. “In the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold 
War, Western countries’ foreign policy was increasingly characterized by the 
promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. This had a significant impact on 
ASEAN’s relations with the European Community and the US. The West demanded 
that ASEAN would be more compliance with those norms. However, ASEAN firmly 
rejected to adopt a policy stance more in line with ideals propagated by the West. 
Instead, as a response to the perceived normative assault, the ASEAN way was actively 
promoted as an alternative approach to regional cooperation based on shared values 
among Southeast Asian elites.” With respect for example, to Cambodia’s crisis in 
1970s until 1979s any substantial discussion on the need to intervene was absent, and 
the humanitarian motivations of Vietnam’s intervention which crossed the line of 
humanitarian, but political interest, received virtually no sympathy from the ASEAN 
member-states.10“In East Timor, there were many demands from political elites and 
citizens of the ASEAN member-states to stop the oppressive acts by way of 
undertaking collective action assisted by military force.” 
ASEAN’s principle, as matter of fact, of non-interference has offered its member states 
to focus on building its own nation and ensure regional stability while can still 
maintaining cooperative ties with other ASEAN Member States and international 
community.  
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“While ASEAN’s principle has never been an absolute or compulsory, and has often 
been used as a tool for legitimate state-behavior in the interests of both the political and 
economic elite, in recent years common interests have come to play a more important 
role in the association’s conduct of regional affairs. The increasing of interdependence 
among ASEAN Member States and the necessary of the good governance have been 
taken into account of the association to regain relevance and credibility among the 
region’s own citizens as well as on the broader global scene. In this respect, the 
principle’s function as a guiding light for the association’s behavior in regional affairs 
has become increasingly fragile in recent years. With its new policy of allowing for 
public criticism of other states’ affairs where regional security is at stake, together with 
a more assertive stance on human rights, ASEAN has moved beyond its traditional 
non-interference approach11. Yet, the non-interference principle, as it is interpreted 
today, still acts as a comparatively strong restraint on ASEAN’s behavior in regional 
affairs. The principle’s guiding function is seriously undermined, but to date a new 
code of conduct as an appropriate replacement for the non-interference-policy proves 
difficult to develop in light of the continuing domestic instability in many of the 
member-states.”  
c. Cambodia Clashed with Thailand over Preah Vihear Temple 
 
The Khmer Empire ruled much of mainland Southeast Asia from the Ninth to the 
Fifteenth centuries of the Common Era. Its people were some of history’s most skilled 
and prolific builders in stone. Their large-scale creations – Angkor Wat is the best 
known – are commonly called mountain temples, because in height, mass, and mystical 
essence they evoke Mount Meru, the mist-shrouded home of the Hindu gods. The 
Khmer usually built on flatlands, but sometimes they made a mountain temple an 
                                                        
11MiekeMoltho, “ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Interference” issued on February 8, 2012; 






extension of the real thing. At Preah Vihear, this approach reached its culmination. The 
temple stands atop a five-hundred-twenty-meter crag. Preah Vihear is one of the 
world’s masterworks of religious architecture when Cambodia reached its great 
civilization during the ancient time. During the Khmer Empire’s long rule over the 
Southeast Asia, Preah Vihear temple was known as a font of miracles, a place where 
Shiva appeared to the faithful. Priests and commoners came in pilgrimage from the 
faraway capital, Yasothak borak or Angkor, to pay their respect and tribute. Sadly after 
the Khmer Empire dramatically declined in late 15th century, parts of its land and 
temples are now in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam.  
Preah Vihear temple, the Cambodian architecture when it was powerful and prosper, 
sometimes causes violent feud since Thailand shows no sign to back off over the 
demand over the ownership of the temple and the land around it. The struggle at the 
temple can be seen as the latest round of a process that has been reshaping Southeast 
Asia since the peak of Khmer imperial glory in the Twelfth Century: the expansion of 
Thai and Vietnamese states at the expense of the Khmer state. This history colors the 
consciousness of today Cambodians, who tend to see the temple as their generation’s 
hold-at-all costs front in the long conflict.12 A 1962 World Court decision awarding the 
temple to Cambodia did nothing to calm the emotions and clashes between the two 
countries. In 2008 and again in 2011, bullets, rockets and artillery shells flow for days; 
and Thai shells inflicted jagged wounds on some of the ancient stones cause damages 
to the temple and Cambodian villages. Across the border, a vocal segment of Thai 
society contends that the temple is Thai property stolen by Cambodia through the 
World Court and it worth going to war to regain.13 
 
“It will be necessary quite simply to examine the joint map of the treaty, the map that’s 
valid”, said Cambodian Foreign Minister Son Sann, at the start of talks about Preah 
Vihear with Thai officials in 1958. “There are difficulties because the maps were 
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created by France, colonial France… I admit the existence of the French map. You use 
it, that’s your right. [But] I can’t acknowledge that it’s fair”, said Thai Foreign Minister 
Prince Naradhip Bongsarabandh, responding to the Cambodian side. The case went on 
and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian King, went on from county to country 
campaigning to pressure Thailand to withdraw its troops from Preah Vihear temple of 
Cambodia. During that time leaders of the two countries exchanged accusations 
admitting the war of words through newspapers and radios. Thais wisely considered 
Sihanouk to be mentally unbalanced, a liar and closet communist. Cambodians saw 
Phibun, the man who had overseen an invasion of their country in 1941, as scheming to 
do the same again. Stronger vitriol was saved for Sarit Thanarat, the army officer who 
overthrew Phibun in 1957.14 
 
With the Thais settled into Preah Vihear and showing no interest in talking about it, 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk and his cabinet began mulling what other strategy might 
work. Thailand was clearly the superior military and diplomacy was having no effect. 
But Cambodia went over Thailand’s head and put the dispute before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). 
 
On June 15, 1962 the court’s decision was announced. The verdict reads out loud by 
Chief Judge Winiarski of Poland, “The court, by nine votes to three, finds that the 
Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia. 
Thailand was under obligation to withdraw any military or police forces, or other 
guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian 
territory. By seven votes to five, the judges ruled that Thailand was also obliged to 
return any sculpture, inscription stones and other object that had been taken from the 
temple since 1954.” The decision of the court made outcry Thailand and its top leaders. 
Thailand’s Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat, reacting to the World Court’s decision by 
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saying, “We will shoot to kill as they approach the frontier!” referring the Cambodian 
officials who will come to take full control over Preah Vihear temple. This arrogant 
and encroachment attitude at the expenses of Cambodia won’t exhausted, a few hours 
later street in Thailand were filled with protesters petition the Palace and the Prime 
Minister Office demanding absolute everything Thai’s government can to control 
Preah Vihear, including going to war with Cambodia. General Praphas, the Interior 
Minister, raised the so-called, he described as imperialist complaint. He claimed, “The 
court took as basis for its judgment a map forced upon us at gunpoint by French with 
gunboats.” 15 Thailand also angered judges in the Court and even banned legal 
counselors of Cambodian team – Dean Acheson – from entering its country, not to 
mention its provocation and threatens to drop out of an international conference in 
Geneva as well as wage war with Cambodia. Thailand’s sentiment continues, Sarit was 
air nationwide saying, “The Thai people will always remember that the temple of Phra 
Viharn was robbed from us by the trickery of those who disregard honestly and justice. 
Beloved Thai brethren, one day in the future, the temple of Phra Viharn shall return to 
the Thai nation’s fold.”  
 
The conflict still occurred even Thailand announced that it will complies with the court 
decision. Thailand didn’t withdraw its soldiers far from the temple as drown in the 
1907 map or what the Thai politicians also exploit for political interest, the so-called 
“4.6 square kilometers”, but instead set fence within Cambodian territory south of the 
1907 map’s border causing further dispute and exchanges of fire from both sides. On 
the Thai-Cambodian border, skirmishes frequently broke out. In 1966, the fighting 
flared at the temple itself when about a hundred Thai troops attacked a border post at 
Preah Vihear, captured five men and occupied the temple, not to mention Thailand 
military assistant guerrillas to instabalize Cambodia and the newly built barbed wire 
fence atop the mountain. The Preah Vihear temple won’t be a peace as it’s built for by 
Cambodian ancestors.  
                                                        





The conflict came to live again when Cambodian successfully listed Preah Vihear 
temple in the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 
July 7, 2008. “There were bombs and tiny bullets that seemed as small as mosquitoes. 
We ran up the steps, trying to make it to the ancient stone walls,” said Sea Chantha, a 
Cambodian vendor, describing Thai fire and clusterbombs into Cambodia that 
destroyed the market at the base of the northern stairway, including seriously damaging 
the temple. “We said: let’s go there, to the ditch.” We thought it would be safe”16 The 
clash between soldiers of both countries broke out. The sentiment of Thailand goes on, 
“Cambodia was using UNESCO and World Court status as cover to help itself to Thai 
territory.” In early 2011, fighting on a scale far more lethal than the one that broke out 
in 2008 as both sides used long-rang weapons. Thai artillery shells rained down 
kilometers deep inside Cambodia, including cluster bombs which banned by the 
international community. Cambodian side used rockets to reach equally far into 
Thailand. The conflict remains until today causing both military clash and diplomatic 
tension and Thai soldiers still station inside Cambodian territory.  
 
III. The South China Sea Issue and Its Root Causes 
 
The potential conflicts and the tension over the South China Sea has originally arisen 
from a complex series of overlapping claim over islands and water that rich in oil, 
natural gas and the freedom of navigation. In 1995, the study made by Russian’s 
Research of Geology of Foreign Countries estimated that the equivalent of 6 billion 
barrels of oil and natural gas might be located in the Spratly Island, a claimed island 
between China and Vietnam. Similarity, the Pan Shiying of the Foundation for 
International and Strategic Studies in Beijing estimated that oil and natural gas reserves 
in the Spratly islands account to 17.7 billion tons which ranks fourth in the world after 
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Kuwait. The U.S. Geological Survey also estimated that about 60 to 70 percent17 of the 
regions ‘hydrocarbon resources are gas making that surrounding area the lifetime of 
each claimant states and shows no sight to back off. The Philippines has a similar 
interest and position to Vietnam for its economic development and interest; and with 
the backup of the U.S., the tension increases and each party claims to own that 
sovereignty regardless of negotiation and peaceful resolutions. The control of the 
Spratly and other areas in the South China Sea is vital for claimants’ economic 
interests which matches to the Realist Theory which claims the conflicts arises from 
struggling to expand for larger land and resources for the need of the country or in 
other words, the economics is the root of claimants ’extreme and aggressive stand 
which is the most divided issue of the conflict.18 
 
a. The South China Sea and International Law 
 
It’s the true legality that the capitalist prosperity leads to military expansion. States in 
the course of rapid development do more trade with the outside world, and 
consequently develop global interest that requires protection by means of hard power. 
The economic rise of post-Civil War America in the late nineteenth century led to the 
building of a great navy. The culmination of industrial development in Europe at the 
turn of the twentieth century was an arms race that helped created WWI.19Is the rising 
China and its military modernization follow the same footprint of the event in America 
and Europe?  
It’s very steepness of Asia’s economic rise, especially China’s GPD, from the 1970s 
through the first decade of the twenty-first century that causes its leaders to pound their 
chests with military modernization and capability. Whereas it took the Great Britain 
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nearly six decades to double its per capita income during its industrial revolution 
following the late eighteenth century, and it took America five decades to do the same 
following the Civil War, China doubled its per capita income in the first decade after 
its late-twentieth-century takeoff. Not surprisingly, Asia’s military budget spending 
rises as the result of economic growth and resource scarcity leading to military 
confrontation. In the narrative report of Desmond Ball 20 , suggests that from the 
late1980s to the late 1990s budget on national defense rose so dramatically; and 
countries in Asia share global military expenditure nearly doubled, meaning from 11 to 
20 percent. The report also suggests that Asia’s share of arms imports increased from 
15 to 41 percent of the world total, one of the biggest military spending on earth. China, 
particularly, which its economy was upended by 1997-1998 economic crisis, its 
defense budget has been increased by double digits nearly every year since 1988, 
leading to the biggest in size of its defense budget over the past two decades.21 In 2011, 
according to the report, China’s defense budget rose another 12.7 percent to nearly 
$100 billion while U.S. defense budget is $708 billion. As a matter of principle, China 
spends only around 2 percent of its GDP on defense, whereas the United States spends 
4.7 percent.22 These pose great concern to the United States and its allies in a way that 
U.S. interest is subject to be shared with China in years to come.  
 
There are possible legal binding laws that can be explained the issues over the South 
China Sea. That assumption, unfortunately, is hard to prove and the South China Sea is 
far from the specificity of the law. There are two possible sets of laws, indeed, to 
explain the issues – an older form governs historical claims to territory and a newer 
form which defined by the United Nations namely the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)23, governs the maritime claims that can be measured 
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from territorial claims. The South China Sea is where the two forms intersect and 
perhaps collide.24 
 
The international rules about claiming territory were laid down by those most active in 
acquiring it. In these bad old days, before the foundation of the League of Nations, they 
recognized five ways that territory could be acquired: (1) conquest through the forcible 
acquisition of rights over territory, (2) cession in a form that another ruler giving up 
their rights through a formal treaty, (3) occupation in a way of establishing an 
administration over territory not belonging to any other ruler which called “empty land” 
or terra nullius regardless of the presence of “native”, (4) prescription the form of 
gradual recognition of one ruler’s rights by others and the last one, (5) accretion where 
land is added to existing territory by reclaiming the sea. In the twentieth century, 
however, having acquired as much territory as they were likely to and, in the wake of 
two savagely destructive world wars, realizing that the costs of conflict now firmly 
outweighed the benefits, the victorious states decided to strike conquest from the list. 
And clearly stated in the United Nations Charter, further acquisitions of territory by 
force were outlawed.25 But what if powerful country acquiring more land? Will the 
“finder’s keepers, loser’s weepers”?  
 
Other countries may have been closer, other fishermen may have visited the island, 
other navies may even have sailed past it but Britain was the first to announce Spratly 
Island in a newspaper – and that is the kind of evidence that tribunal value.  From such 
bumble beginnings, claims of empire grow. It was the first act of sovereignty by any 
state in what we now know as the Spratly Island. Indeed, Britain discreetly revived its 
claim in the weeks after April 1930 when the French authorities announced that they’d 
dispatched a warship taken possession of Spratly Island and laid claim to all the other 
features within a large rectangular area of the South China Sea. The two governments 
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exchanged diplomatic notes and legal arguments for the following two years. With the 
expansion of the Japanese Empire which posed great threat to their colonies neither 
wished to relinquish its own claim, but they both remained calm, and later the French 
government annexed Spratly. The announcement prompted national hysteria in China, 
but the fuss died down when it realized that it related to the Spratly and not to the 
Paracels. These clearly suggest Chinese official protest or rival annexation notices. The 
Philippine government, on the other hands, asserted a claim to the Spratly in July 1946 
but did nothing to enforce it for decades.26 
 
The Vietnam, on the other hands, was colonized by the French with its Laos and 
Cambodia neighbors. When the French pulled out from Vietnam in 1956 and then the 
country was divided between the Communist north and the capitalist south in 1954. 
After years of civil wars, Vietnam again was reunited under the Communist in 1975. 
While it might seem logical that since France was the colonial power in Vietnam, 
therefore French territorial control in the South China Sea would principally fall to 
Vietnam after its independence, that argument is unlikely to satisfy an international 
court. Just like Britain, France has never formally abandoned its claim to the Spratly 
Islands so far. It claimed them on its own account, not on behalf of Vietnam. In 
respond to the pretensions of the Filipino entrepreneur Tomas Cloma, Republic of 
Vietnam (South Vietnam) asserted a claim to the Spratly Islands leading the cue for 
China to reoccupy Itu Aba. 
 
It becomes even more complex when we discuss about the legal situation of the 
Republic of Vietnam itself. The Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North 
Vietnam) viewed the Republic of Vietnam was an illegal puppet state created by the 
imperial powers French and American. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (South 
Vietnam) regarded itself as the legitimate government for the entire country. 
Alternatively once could see the North and South Vietnam as two legitimate states in 
                                                        




separate areas of the national territory. When the North Vietnam defeated the South 
Vietnam in 1975 they officially created a southern Communist state with its own legal 
personality for just over a year before uniting the two countries under a single Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam in 1976. The legalistic nature of international tribunals will 
require a claimant country to show it has established a formal claim to a territory, that 
it has maintained that claim and then asserted in it the face of actions by other 
claimants. Not surprisingly until 1975 the North Vietnam did very little to assert its 
claims in the South China Sea while the South Vietnam did considerably more. If the 
North Vietnam was the legitimate government of the whole country, then its earlier 
lack of action could harm its case. If the South Vietnam is the legitimate state within 
the national territory of Vietnam then Vietnam’s case would be much stronger since it 
took action precisely asserting its claim to the South China Sea.27 
 
There is one particular action taken by the leadership of North Vietnam that has been 
used to undermine the Vietnamese claim to the islands. In 1958 the Prime Minister of 
North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, sent a brief letter to his (Communist) Chinese 
counterpart in which he wrote that, “the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam recognizes and approves the declaration made on 4 September 1958 by the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China regarding the decision taken with 
respect to China’s territorial sea.” 28  This is the clear interpretation of Vietnamese 
commitment not to claim the islands and might seem a somewhat obscure reason to 
deny the Vietnamese claim to the islands but under the customs of international law it 
might amount what’s known as an “estoppels” – It’s intended to promote transparency 
and honesty behavior and is supposed to do the same thing in international law 
meaning if one party agrees that a dispute is settled, they cannot subsequently go back 
on their word.  
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Again on 23 August 1958 forces of the People’s Republic of China began shelling their 
nationalist rivals on the islands of Jinmen and Mazu, both within a few kilometers of 
the Chinese mainland. Eleven days later the Communist Chinese issued a Declaration 
on the Territorial Sea claiming ownership of all waters up to 12 nautical miles offshore 
– encompassing both Jinmen and Mazu. The purpose was primarily to prevent 
American ships from resupplying or defending the islands. But the declaration also 
asserted a territorial claim to Taiwan and its surrounding islands, and to the Paracels, 
Macclesfield Bank and the Spratlys. It a gesture of solidarity against the American 
imperialist North Vietnam printed the declaration in the Communist Party newspaper 
Nhan Dan on 6 September and then, on the 14th, Pham Van Dong sent his letter. The 
letter didn’t explicitly consent to the Communist China’s claim to the islands but 
neither did it explicitly reject it. That failure to pretest might be sufficient grounds for a 
tribunal to regard the Vietnamese claim to the islands as stopped (HAYTON 2014). 
 
b. Dispute Parties, Oil and Gas 
 
In the first ever public declaration of a policy under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 
the discussion with Japan over the East China Sea in October 1978, and the sideline 
meeting with Philippine leaders in 1986 and 1988 respectively, Xiaoping said, “This 
generation is not wise enough to settle such a difficult issue. It would be an idea to 
count on the wisdom of the following generations to settle it.” The statement has been 
the basis of Chinese state policy towards both the East and South China seas ever 
since.29Based on the observation above section we can assume that China’s geopolitics 
interests have something to do with the policies toward territorial disputes. The dispute 
of Paracel and Spratly islands has erupted in 1970 which draw much attention of 
China’s policies toward this regional influence and minimum risk posed by U.S. 
containment policy.  Geographically, archipelago of Paracel is the cluster of islands 
which comprise of 15 islands, sand banks and reefs where situated 150 nautical miles 
                                                        




from Hainan Island, China and in the range of 200 miles from Da Nang, Vietnam. 
Spratly cluster islands are also combined of more than 100 islets and situated Southern 
part of South China Sea. The archipelago expands for more than 500 nautical miles 
from north to south. By nearest-point measures, it is less than 100 nautical miles from 
the coast of either Philippine Palawan or Malaysian Borneo. It is about 350 nautical 
miles east of the southern coast of Vietnam and about 400 nautical miles south of the 
Paracel archipelago.  
Paracel and Spratly Islands were less significant before 1970s, these islands were just 
the Japanese navy base during the pacific war. After the war ended Japanese troops 
withdrew from these islands, French who controlled Indochina at that time and Chinese 
Nationalist government were immediately reoccupied the islands. However, the claim 
was not only occurred in 1970 but it was happened in 1949s by People’s Republic of 
China and in 1955 by South Vietnam. Both countries had claimed the sovereignty over 
these islands.  In the meantime, Taiwan and North Vietnam also reiterated their rights 
over the Paracel and Spratly. On the ground occupation, China was the first country 
stationed and constructed the patrol station on Amphitrite clusters of the Paracel Island 
in late 1955 and the Taiwanese controls Itu Aba in the Spratly archipelago since they 
arrived in 1956 after the withdrawal of Japanese navy troops. But the United States’ 
involvement in regional war had completely changed the portrait of the disputes in 
1970s, however, after losing war to Vietnam communist and withdraw troops from 
Indochina mainland, these islands became the more strategic sea-lanes and the core of 
disputes once again. In term of economic perspective associated of global oil crisis in 
1970, the natural resources deposit beneath the seabed raised the potential sovereign 
claim amongst the claimant states. According to Ministry of Geological Resources and 
Mining of China estimated that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of 
crude oil and later this number has been estimated dramatically increase by China side 
and decrease by the US’s Energy Information Administration. For Natural gas also had 




trillion cubic meters)30 to 2 quadrillion cubic feet (56.6 trillion cubic meters). The 
report went on highlighting the first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off 
Palawan Island (island within the South China Sea belonging to the Philippines). These 
oil fields supply 15% of annual oil consumption in the Philippines, according to the 
same study.  
The economic and political dynamic significance and the pull back and forth have to 
rely on one important legal factor is United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
which cannot be concluded before 1982. Although, the ambiguity of this international 
convention still miss up the world system while of unclear three important component, 
first is territorial sea, second exclusive economic zone and international water or high 
sea, while reflected on the disputes are likely impracticable because the claiming of 
exclusive economic zones are overlapped to the certain area especially in the case of 
Paracel with China and Vietnam. And most of claimants were seeking to claim the 
islands in order to expanse marine rights over the area adjunction to the island, so-
called the regime of islands.   
Ironically, Paracel and Spratly are sitting in the middle of the ocean and the seabed is 
really deep, the depth drop immediately to 1,000 meters and somewhere more deep 
around the sallow reefs and sand banks or islet. Therefore, the share of continental 
shelf is more like to use in the most cases in the disputes, yet the claiming can also 
include a large sea territorial and seabed beneath. According to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the archipelago of Spratly should belong to its 
neighborhood, “Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam”, rather the historical 
presence that made as the evidence of China over the sovereign rights over those 
islands. In addition, the island of Palawan passage between Spratly and the Philippines 
should be placed under the Philippines territorial water and on the basis of the island 
on ground possession.  
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These competing claims have been in active manner occupation. During 1968 until 
1971, Philippine forces occupied five islands in the Spratly archipelago and later 1979 
the claim was expanded over the territorial water around these islands. Their control 
was expanded to seven or eight islands in total by the early 1980s. In 1974, China sent 
forces to expel the South Vietnamese from the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands. 
After having lost the battle for the Paracel, the South Vietnamese government 
immediately sent troops to occupy six islands of the Spratly archipelago. These were 
later taken over by Vietnam communist at the end of the Vietnam War in 1975.  
Nevertheless, in 1980 Amboyna Cay of the Spratly group fell under the control of 
Vietnamese and Hanoi also continue to claim islands that used to occupy by South 
Vietnam forces in both Paracel and Spratly. And in 1983, the Malaysian government 
took its action in asserting a claim to part of the Spratly archipelago by occupying 
Swallow Reefs. 31Resulted from the use of forces to take control of island the relation 
of China and Vietnam has become bitter and bitter from the mid-1970 and it has the 
side effect to the disputes between China, Malaysia and the Philippines. Therefore, the 
appeasements toward conflict resolution have been seeing bumpy.   
c. Military Build Up and Confrontation 
The development of the South China Sea issue is getting worse before they might be 
getting better, in regards to the territorial and maritime resource disputes between 
Asian giant – China – and some of ASEAN Member States. The recently issues 
development presents great threat to regional stability and the freedom of navigation, 
to name a few 
Recently in 23 of November 2013 China declared its own initiative called, “Air 
Defense Identification Zone”, on the East China Sea, an ear which overlapping the 
disputed islands, causes tension with Japan and South Korean, including series of 
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protests from both countries. This imposed present Chinese disputed parties; including 
the United States and Australia to challenge Chinese own initiative air sovereignty, by 
flying into the declared ADIZ without asking Chinese permission, a move that angered 
China until now. In China’s defense logic, Chinese officials were reportedly its 
legitimate right to declare ADIZ in respond to the Japan identified zone which declared 
in the same area fourthly years ago, not to mention the United States and about twenty 
other countries declared zones that require the respect from other country. These 
suggestions also in respond to some Japanese politicians’ threat to shoot down any 
Chinese plans flying over Japanese declared airspace. 
Freedom of navigation, the term express mostly by the international community mainly 
the United States, is strategically the United States core interest and geopolitical 
steppingstone in the South China Sea. This pie of interest was put into test in an 
incident on December 532 when a Chinese battleship maneuvered close the United 
States guiding missile cruiser called “USS Cowpens”, that Chinese navy accused of 
locking on its new aircraft carrier namely “the Liaoning” which on its deployed to the 
South China Sea lately.  
The Philippines plays another card by brining China to the World Court, a game that 
helped escalated more tension. Its winning over the legal strategies at least gives China 
a caution move in line with international law and pressure. Vietnamese fishermen still 
enjoy, on the other hands, fishing in the Paracels and sometimes clashed with Chinese 
vessels causing war of words between the two countries. 
The United States usually launch its own strategy condemning China, calling “China’s 
movement aggressive and provocation”. It sometimes urges Chinese to act in line with 
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international law, particularly, the United Nations on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
In respond, the Chinese Foreign Ministry slams U.S. involvement in the South China 
Sea issue, accusing U.S. of provocations regional instability and heavily armed its 
proxy alliances – mainly the Philippines and Vietnam. In the war of words, both the 
United States and China loudly accused each other of violating international law. 
While the United Sates of American has been urging China to act in line with the 
international law – UNCLOS – and respect the World Court ruling, The United States 
Senate itself never ratified that convention. This absence of UNCLOS ratification 
clearly damages U.S’s credibility when it urges other to act in line with international 
law, mainly UNCLOS. 
The issue of the South China Sea, no question or doubt about it, presents the potential 
arm race in the 21st century in Asia, especially the increasing budget of ASEAN 
nations on national defense. According to many narrative reports, Chinese navy is very 
comparative compare to U.S. navy and it is now taking the role of the world’s second-
largest naval fleet and it’s the second-largest military budget spending in mankind after 
the United States. The Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute estimated 
China’s 2012 defense spending at $166 billion – a 12 per cent increase on the year 
before.33 Chinese ship numbers appear even more dramatic when compared to the US 
Navy, which has around 96 large combatants, 72 submarines, 30 large amphibious 
ships, 26 small combatants and 10 aircraft carriers.34 And unlike the Chinese Navy, 
whose ships are concentrated in one area, US Navy ships are spread around the globe. 
The Chinese Navy currently might pose little threat to the United States, but with its 
increasingly budget spending on the defense, it may one day capable to pose real threat 
to the US Navy ships in Asia. One Chinese academic wrote, “China doesn’t want to 
see the US block its sea transport lands but it doesn’t have a clear strategy about how 
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to respond. It doesn’t know what to do. China’s leaders are well aware, however, that 
they are profoundly lucky. Their unprepared military faces no immediate mortal threats 
and the country has time to build up its economic and military strength to face the 
challenges ahead. It’s enjoying what its ideologues call the period of strategic 
opportunity – our current era of relative peace, stability and prosperity.”35 
 
There is little doubt, in the minds of China’s military leadership, that if the country 
were to fight the United States in the next decades or two its armed forces would be 
humiliated and its economy blockaded and strangled. Even a small setback could cause 
major problems for a government craving public legitimacy. Chinese leadership is 
clearly trying to protect the period of strategic opportunity – military and economic 
strength – as they believe its enemies have nefarious plans to lure it into conflict in 
order to keep it weak. But this gives China a major problem. If its neighbors around the 
South China Sea believe that Beijing will never fight a war, then its strategic influence 
will be greatly reduced. It’s understood that the gap between the two sides will narrow 
and the chances of conflict will grow. China has the ambition to drive the United States 
away, but it doesn’t have the military capacity to do so. In the meantime each military 
will play up the threat from the other and enjoy the benefits of budgetary support that 
follow. The danger is that the two confrontation taking place in the South China Sea – 
one between China and the United States over access and the other between China and 
its neighbors over territory – will interact in unpredictable ways.  
 
d. The U.S. Pivot Policy to Asia: Constructive or Divisive?   
 
By 2010 officials and military planners at the U.S. Department of Defense were fully 
engaged with the access denial problem posed by China’s military modernization. 
According to the report published by the Naval Institute Press released in 2014, the 
current U.S. responses to China’s military challenge are incomplete, uncompetitive, 





and impractical. The military responses are too narrowly focused and thus fail to take 
advantage of a full range of options that could be available to policymakers and 
commanders.36 The report highlighted, the U.S. military forces have become highly 
dependent on space and computerized global communication systems. At the same 
time, China has already acquired a high level of expertise with both space and 
counterpaces operation with its cyber-warfare and billions of dollars spending on the 
defense.  
 
The report goes on highlighting the economic damage inside the United States and 
China would also be server. As an authoritarian country, with strict censorship controls 
and a large internal security apparatus, it is reasonable to presume that the Chinese 
Communist Party and government would stand a better chance to outlasting the 
domestic and global political backlash from the blockade’s consequences. The U.S. 
intervention in Asia will also boost geopolitical ties between China and Russia and 
greatly increase Russia’s overall geopolitical and economic role, as a result not in 
America’s interest. Europe’s trade with China would go through Russia, which could 
cause Europe to strategically drift away from the United States. The United States 
faces an open-ended contest with China over influence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Policy makers on both sides of this contest will have to get comfortable with the fact 
that this competition will occur even as the two countries mutually benefit from trade 
and financial linkages.37 
 
IV. Cambodia’s Stand towards South China Sea Issue 
If we see the South China Sea issue in the realist perspective, we may then begin to see 
the necessary of some of its elements such as a conviction that international relations 
are necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolves by 
                                                        
36 ROBERT HADDICK, “FIRE ON THE WATER: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific”, Naval 





war, a high regard for the values of national security and state survival; and of course 
the basic skepticism that there can be progress in international politics that is 
comparable to that in domestic political life. “Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbs, and 
indeed all classical realists, share that view to a greater or lesser extent. They believe 
that the acquisition and possession of power, and the deployment and uses of power, 
are a central preoccupation of political activity.”38 It’s clearly suggests national interest 
and state survival are more necessary than depending on international community or 
any existing international norm. The power politic in this regards is the arena of rivalry, 
conflict, and war between states in which the same basic problems of defending the 
national interest and ensuring the survival of the state repeat themselves over and over 
again. International relations, therefore, is to protect and defend the interest of the state 
in world politics. “International relations are primarily relations of states. All other 
actors in world politics – individuals, international organizations, NGOs, etc. – are 
either far less important or unimportant.”39 
On the other hands, if we see the South China Sea issue in the liberalist perspective, we 
then may come up with different approaches of dealing with this issue. Whenever we 
think about liberalist perspective, we then will start to understand its peaceful motto – 
freedom, cooperation, peace, and progress – or “the Rule of Law” of John Locke, 
“Liberal States Respect International Law” of Bentham, and “Republics will Establish 
Perpetual Peace” of Kant, to name just a few. The liberal perspective in international 
relation is closely connected with the emergence of the modern liberal state. Liberals 
generally take a positive view of human nature. They have great faith in human reason 
and they are convinced that rational principles – international laws and norms – can be 
applied to international affairs. The core concern of liberalism is peace and happiness 
of individual human beings. “In contrast to realists, who see the state first and foremost 
as a concentration and instrument of power, liberals see the state a constitutional entity 
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which establishes and enforces the rule of law… Such constitutional states would also 
respect each other and would deal with each other in accordance with norms of mutual 
toleration.”40 
These two theoretical approaches provide us foundation to see the nature of 
Cambodian’s foreign policy, especially its stand toward to South China Sea issue 
whether it profoundly trust the international institutions or placing its national interest 
and survival above all.  
a. Flexible Engagement and Non-Interference: Cambodia’s Official 
Position 
The South China Sea issue was silence for decades, but sadly it has once again come to 
live on the top agenda of ASEAN and the United States. The South China Sea is the 
testing milestone of both China’s relation with ASEAN and the United States 
commitment to its alliance which mostly involve in the dispute. If dispute parties failed 
to manage the issue, will the soft-power and constructive engagement principle really 
exist somewhere else?  
Despite being paid much attention on the South China Sea issue, the current 
development of the issue isn’t pretty much new from its old form of development. The 
prediction by the United State analysts in 1990s suggested that the South China Sea 
will be the flashpoint for resources and influences in Asia, but until then the United 
States showed no commitment or any specific military present there until China made a 
move ahead recently. Nothing surprises that much and the current development of the 
South China Sea issue has not changed much since the outbreak in 1990s. We, 
however, have to take into account about the notable changes made when projecting it 
in a smaller perspective. The relationship between China and ASEAN is bitter than 
sweetness, not to mention military confrontation and the United States encouragement.  
                                                        




The overall relations between China and ASEAN have been mutually positive and 
constructive more than confrontation. ASEAN Member States, including Cambodia is 
benefiting equally by transforming aspects of differences into the regional political, 
economic, social, and security dynamics following ASEAN Non-interference Principal 
and regional stability at large. All these fruitful transformation have long term positive 
impact on the behavior of dispute parties’ position in the South China Sea issue 
whether managing issue for the Win Win Policy or playing Zero Sum Game by 
ignoring regional peace and security.  
b. Cambodia Internal Political Pressure  
In September 1, 2016, a Vietnamese facebook user Bao Lam stormed in Prime 
Minister Hun Sen’s personal Facebook page expressing his anger on behalf of his 
fellow Vietnamese people which is not the first time that Cambodian Prime Minister’s 
facebook page is verbally attacked by Vietnamese users in regard to Cambodia’s 
position over the South China Sea. She went on saying, “Cambodia eats the porridge 
then pisses in the bowl,” she wrote in Vietnamese, using an idiom from her country. 
“Vietnam has sacrificed both our blood and money to save the Cambodian people from 
genocide. Now, Hun Sen is turning his back on Vietnam.”41 
The conversation went further from not only accusing Cambodia’s position over the 
South China Sea, with Ms. Lam saying the prime minister would not be perched in his 
“high chair” 42  without Vietnamese help, referring to the Vietnamese invasion in 
Cambodia in 1979 to topple the Khmer Rouge Regime and backed up the government 
lead by then Cambodian’s People Party (CPP) which is Mr. Hun Sen the President and 
Prime Minister Candidate. This has always been a hot spot and has been used for 
decades by the opposition party mainly the Cambodian National Rescues Party (CNRP) 
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to attract voters and pressure to government at some extents. Vietnam, not surprise, 
continue building several white zones and dig ponds inside Cambodian territory 
regardless of countless diplomatic notes and protest from Cambodia. These are the 
effective nationalist card for the opposition party to enjoy and won the party significant 
popular support. 
Cambodia’s past greatness, the Great Khmer Empire from 9th to 13th century, as 
reconstructed is another aspect of its history that has weighed heavily of most of its 
people and elites. The perspective of Thailand and Vietnam invasion and the utopia of 
bringing Cambodia back to its greatness have always been used by some of its elites, 
including present opposition leaders to gain popular support. “The combination of 
personality, domineering political habits, proximity to Thailand and Vietnam, and 
unrealistic notions of innate greatness blended from the 1940s onward into a volatile 
form of nationalism which dominated the political scene for many years and which 
even now is occasionally called back into play by opposition politicians in Phnom 
Penh.”43 
In an interview with the Cambodia Daily about Cambodia’s position over the South 
China Sea issue, Dr. John Ciorciari, a Cambodian scholar and associate professor at the 
University of Michigan’s Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, said, “Hun Sen 
probably would not have chosen to antagonize Vietnam over the South China Sea 
absent real Chinese pressure, but his decision to do so reflects a recalibration driven 
both by domestic political and strategic calculations.” He opted by saying, “The prime 
minister clearly sees a close relationship with China as his regime’s key international 
backstop … close ties to Vietnam are a domestic vulnerability Cambodia’s opposition 
leaders are keen to exploit.” 
                                                        





At this point, the Royal Government of Cambodia is facing two challenges, first 
supporting disputed states mainly Vietnam, but face domestic political pressure as the 
vast majority Cambodians people don’t view Vietnam as “trustworthy friend”, but 
rather “the opportunist neighbor” that has been exploiting Cambodia for centuries since 
the declined of the Great Khmer Empire. Second, distance itself from the issue since 
it’s not involve in the dispute and enjoy great domestic political support, including 
Chinese investments and assistance, but face international criticism which is mainly 
U.S. allies. This tough decision might be a new test of Cambodian foreign policy after 
King Norodom Sihanouk’s administration, but no question or doubt about it, the 
national interest might overweight ASEAN’s Unity. 
c. Cambodia’s Relation with China and the U.S.  
Cambodia-China Relationship: Cool and Hot Relationship – Relationship between 
China and Cambodia date back at least to the 3rd century and the notable one in 13th 
century when Cambodia reached its peak of civilization which was known as the Great 
Khmer Empire. According to the stone script on the wall of Cambodia’s Angkor Wat 
and other temples noted that Chinese emissary Zhou Daguan—known in Khmer as 
Chiv Ta Koan— had visited the Great Khmer Empire for one year, from 1296 to 1297. 
He recorded every daily living of commoners and the practices of Cambodian Royal 
Courts and its state administration. Centuries later, ties between the two countries are 
at their strongest ever, but despite their long diplomatic history, China and Cambodia 
once again grew pretty close during the WWII after Cambodia gained its independence 
from the France Protectorate in the late 1953s. In the modern history of Cambodia, 
relationship with China is usual despite its bad images in Cambodian modern history 
such as Chinese support Khmer Rouge, to name a few.  
The relationship developed while the globe was caught amidst a struggle between 
communism and democracy when World War II ended in 1945. At the time, the 




neutrality. Cambodia pursued relations with China in order to mitigate the influence of 
neighboring countries Thailand and South Vietnam that provided assistance to anti-
Sihanouk rebels – the Khmer Rouge.  
China’s aid has helped war-torn Cambodia to build a modern infrastructure, modernize 
Cambodian’s arm forces, and diplomatic support from Beijing helps the impoverished 
Cambodia fend off bullying from its neighbors mainly Thailand and Vietnam. 
Cambodia, however, also faces accusation by its ASEAN Member States and foreign 
medias as Beijing’s agent to divide ASEAN Unity on critical issues particularly the 
South China Sea issue, but sadly ASEAN Unity never existed since its creation and 
each Member States has always been trying absolute everything it case to maximize its 
national interest.  
According to the narrative study published by Voice of American (VOA) claimed that 
in 1997, China provided U.S. $6 million worth of assistance to Cambodia, high-level 
delegations from the two nations began a regular exchange of official visits, and 
economic ties were strengthened after years of genocides and political turbulence in 
Cambodia. In December of 1997, China provided Phnom Penh’s government with a 
loan of U.S. $2.8 million to bolster Cambodia’s military and by July 1998 the flow of 
investment from China to Cambodia had increased by nearly three-fold to U.S. $113 
million from U.S. $36 million a year earlier, according to the same report. Again, in  
February 1999, Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen paid his first ever visit to China 
as the leader of Cambodia and secured a free loan of U.S. $200 million, in addition to a 
pledge of U.S. $18.3 million in aid from Beijing for the development of its 
infrastructures and agriculture.  
In addition to trades and economic assistance, China also provides military training and 
hardware to Cambodia. In December 1999, according to the same report of the Voice 
of America (VOA), China provided U.S. $1.5 million worth of construction materials 




making China the largest source of financial assistance to Cambodia’s military44. In 
November 2000, President Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese leader to visit 
Cambodia, pledging support from Cambodia over the Taiwan’s independent campaign 
which two years later Beijing canceled U.S. $200 million of Phnom Penh’s loan debt. 
Years later, China also offers interest-free loan and additional assistance worth U.S. 
$12.5 million, while the two countries agreed to prioritize agriculture, human resources 
and infrastructure development in bilateral cooperation. Similarity in 2006, Premier 
Wen Jiabao paid his first state visit to Cambodia and pledged U.S. $600 million in 
development assistance and loans to Cambodia, including U.S. $33 million for the 
construction of a new office for Cambodia’s Council of Ministers, including millions 
of dollars military equipment during the clash between Cambodia and Thailand over 
the Preah Vihear Temple.  
Cambodia-U.S. Relations: Nightmares Relationship – For decades, the United 
States and Cambodia share both sweetness and bitter relationship as a result of armed 
conflict and years of proxy wars in Cambodia. The relationship between Cambodia and 
the United States isn’t quite good and Cambodia’s elites seem less interest 
strengthening relationship with its former carpet bomber. Backing General Lon Nol to 
toppled King Norodom Sihanouk in 1970 and the declaration of Republic of Cambodia 
gave a bitter task to the vast majority Cambodians people. With the escalation of 
Vietnam War, U.S. under Nixon’s leadership ordered carpet-bombing Cambodia to the 
grown leaving UXOs twice than it dropped during the World War II, and killed a half 
of millions of Cambodian innocent people and children causing the nationalist 
movement known as the Khmer Rouge which unpredictably killed another 2 million 
Cambodian people mostly intellectual and public servants.  
The relationships between Cambodia and the United States went worse for decades. 
Full diplomatic relations between Cambodia and the United States was established 
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after the United Nations Transactional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) prepared the 
first ever National Election in 1993 after the collapsed of the Pol Pot regime. President 
Obama was the first incumbent U.S. President to visit Cambodia in the East Asia 
Submit in November 2012 hosted by Cambodia. The United States interest is mainly 
on human rights, good governance, prevention and awareness of HIV/AIDS, fight 
malnutrition and trafficking as well as corruption, including the address on 
environmental exploitation and effective use of natural resources, all are sensitive 
issues for the Cambodian’s government making diplomatic tension and sometimes 
amid a war of words.  
U.S. interest over Cambodia remain low and its assistance to Cambodia remain small 
compare to millions tons of bombs it dropped on Cambodia. The data released by the 
State Department confirmed that in 2014, U.S. foreign assistance for programs in 
health, education, governance, economic growth, and demining of unexploded 
ordnance totaled over $77.6 million, and each year the United States donate USD$5 
million for the clearance of UXOs, according to Cambodian Mine Actions Center 
(CMAC). U.S., however, is the largest single country purchaser of Cambodia’s exports 
– manufacturing output mainly garment sectors that provide Cambodians people tens 
of thousands job opportunities. The relationship between Cambodia and the United 
States goes up and down, and sometimes is worse which requires further understanding 
and mutual cooperation.  
d. Strategic Cooperation: Rebalancing Cooperation between China 
and U.S.  
 
Rebalancing the relationship between China and USA is the tough assignment for 
Cambodia. Cambodia may find it difficult to dance with two different people at the 
same time, while dancing alone might be out of date. Many experts suggest, Cambodia 




Cambodia’s interest. Cambodia seems clearly understand its position once things go 
too far with either China or U.S., no one will likely want to dance with Cambodia.  
 
It’s understood that the U.S. is considered as the largest Cambodian foreign market, 
accounting for about a half of the country’s garment sector exports—an industry 
provides approximately 400,000 jobs to Cambodians people.45 Cambodia is also the 
5thlargest recipient country of U.S. foreign assistance in Southeast Asia after Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Myanmar. According to the same source, in 2014, the 
United States provided assistance worth $70.9 million, mostly to non-governmental 
organizations that engaging in humanitarian and human rights work in Cambodia. 
Despite it past bitter relationship, Cambodia and the United States has recently engage 
more actively and the relationship has been improved remarkably, but both countries 
need to further its commitment and bilateral ties. 
U.S. interest is mainly focus on human rights related issues and good governance, and 
its aid is subject to strict rules and conditions, while China’s assistance is without 
string attached. Thus, it is understood that China and US have endorsed different aid 
and development strategies. The United States has vigorously focus human rights, rule 
of law, democratization, regional security, political development and followed by 
socio-economic, trade and investment. Contrary, China is concentrated on developing 
physical infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and public buildings, which lead to 
access Cambodia natural resources, business and political advantage.46 As a matter of 
fact, China seems understand Cambodian need and difficulties more than the United 
States do.  
As Machiavelli noted in his book, The Prince, he suggested  “A prince ought never to 
make common cause with one more powerful than himself to injure another, unless 
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necessity forces him to it … for if he wins you rest in his power, and princes must 
avoid as much as possible being under the will and pleasures of others.” Therefore, 
even though Cambodia’s relationship with great powers might be weighed differently 
depending on circumstances, Cambodia must never close the door of friendship and 
cooperation with any major power.47 




a. Cambodia’s Position and Initiated Peaceful Resolutions 
 
The notable milestone and fruitful discussion between ASEAN and China in 2002 was 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the 
Declaration of Code of Conduct in 2012, both agreements were signed in Cambodia, 
have yet reached its ambition in reducing differences and promoting mutual trust for 
the sake of regional stability and co-existing between China and some disputed 
ASEAN Member States; and at the same times prevent the escalating of the issues. The 
agreements at some points has being playing an importantly role as a guideline for 
disputed parties to begin their negotiation, but the lack of political willingness among 
disputed states leave the agreement at dark. What else will help to resolve the issues if 
both DOC and COC are not even taken into account? 
 
i. Declaration of Conduct 
UNCLOS mechanism failed to solve the conflict, Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) has been trying to play its maximum role reducing confrontation 
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and diplomatic tension with China when they realized that facing off with China isn’t a 
good choice, both economically and military cost. In 2002 the Declaration of Conduct 
of parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was adopted by ASEAN – China in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia. The DOC aims to ensure peaceful solutions to the disputes and at the 
same time to conduct maritime cooperation between disputed states in order to 
maintain peace and stability in the region. Although DOC was inked by China and 
ASEAN, however, disputed states have put less cooperation or put no effort to reduce 
the complexities of the issues and differences. Instead confrontation has frequently 
raised and states continue protesting and accusing their counterparts and campaigned 
the unilateral jurisdictional regulations and exclusive economic zones to claim their 
sovereignty in the disputed areas of the South China Sea.  
The DOC clearly stated three objectives; promoting confidence-building measures, 
engaging in practical maritime cooperation, and setting the stage for the discussion and 
the conclusion of the formal and binding COC. The top priority of national interest and 
the poor guidelines and effective mechanism of DOC make it death before seeing 
sunlight. There isn’t any provision of DOC explain activities that can be considered as 
“escalating or rising the tension”. According to the printed DOC, its provision 
provided little information on the specific implementation of its three main objectives, 
not even forms of cooperation in the South China Sea or policy guidelines to push for 
the goodwill cooperation.  
In contrary, we can also see its good progresses on maintaining regional peace and 
good cooperation between China and ASEAN. It has served as the political platform 
for ASEAN and China to find ways based on the mutual interest of both parties. The 
DOC has contributed to several cases of cooperation in the South China Sea such as 
the tripartite joined study among China, Philippines and Vietnam from 2005 to 2008 




We also need to acknowledge DOC progressive and peaceful platform of negotiation 
between China and some ASEAN Member States over the South China Sea issue. A 
few years after DOC was signed, China and its ASEAN counterparts involving in 
dispute agreed to engage in maritime cooperation and those we can see in the regular 
ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) annually to study the possible 
implementation of the DOC and working groups to reduce miscommunication. This 
cooperation produce numbers of specific policy measures for the implementation of the 
DOC and helped reduce complicated and escalation of the issues for years.  
China’s premier Wen Jiabao said, “China would continue to be a good neighbor, a 
good friend and good partner of ASEAN. China is willing to work with ASEAN 
Member States towards a comprehensive implementation of the DOC. China is also 
willing to discuss the drafting the COC.”48 ASEAN and China at that time agreed to 
include the DOC implementation guidelines, while China at the same time pledged to 
provide US$4 billion in preferential loans for infrastructure development in ASEAN 
Member States making cooperation is further improving. These can be argued that both 
China and its ASEAN counterparts are willing to cooperate and the DOC is at some 
points give them principles guidelines to negotiate and work together.  
ii. Code of Conduct 
After the Declaration of Conduct, ASEAN and China agreed to ink another agreement, 
Code of Conducts (COC), in Cambodia in 2012 to provide detail guidelines dealing 
with the South China Sea. The detailed outline focused on three main parts: the first 
section is the preamble listing agreement between ASEAN and China’s obligation to 
settle the disputes peacefully in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. 
The second section suggests the operative provision of the COC and effective 
mechanism to monitor the implement of the code. The last section recommends that 
                                                        





the signatories accept in the dispute settlement mechanism included in the ASEAN 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the Southeast Asia (TAC). Differ from the DOC’s; 
the COC is likely having more binding force for the signatories to strictly compliance.  
In 15 of September 2013, China and ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on the Code of 
Conduct (COC) was hosted by China in Suzhou which all parties agreed to kick of the 
progress of COC and its peaceful principles on observing and adopting a peaceful 
approach in regards to the South China Sea issue and differences. This development 
must a bit upset the United States effort in turning the issues into more controversial 
with its alliances in Asia.  
The existing ASEAN mechanism can be compliance by concern parties, but it requires 
substantial which requires good cooperation and political goodwill. Expecting political 
goodwill might be the greatest challenges since each disputed party will always have 
differences external and internal pressures or goals to accomplish. The DOC and COC 
were signed, indeed, but have no legal binding force or mechanism besides urging 
disputes parties to act in line with its regulations and provision; it has nothing else to 
weights the peaceful solutions, not to mention the UNCLOS. The absence of legal 
biding force of DOC and COC and the lack of good coordination between ASEAN and 
China are also the source of disputes and rising tensions in the South China Sea, 
including the intervention of the United States and its alliances. This political 
unwillingness and the act of aggressiveness of each dispute party have been 
contributed to the difficulties of dealing the issues or even enable DOC and COC to die 
before giving its birth.  
In the provision of the COC, there isn’t any specific mentioned over the geographical 
coverage of the area; and thus disputed parties have always been argued that their 
actions are legally in their legitimate maritime and exclusive economic zones which 
cause the rising tensions and military confrontation. In addition to this poor provision, 




issues and the implementation of COC and DOC. This political unwilling and distrust 
among dispute parties make COC and DOC find it difficult to even further improve its 
weakness and apply into the practices.  
The implementation of COC is rational to conclude that it will progress, but not be an 
easy journey. There will be very tough, no question or doubt about it, discussion and 
negotiation on the amendment to better understanding and implementation about its 
provisions toward the issue. And it’s necessary to keep in mind that, COC will never 
able to safeguard regional peace and stability when disputed parties put no effort in 
political goodwill and sharing interest.  
b. Cambodia National Interest with China 
Just like the Philippines and Vietnam that received billions of dollars, not to mention 
military hardware, from the United States for taking the frontline with China over the 
South China Sea, Cambodia enjoys the same things. China is Cambodia’s largest 
foreign donors and trade partner in 2010. According to data compiled by Cambodia’s 
government, Beijing has provided Phnom Penh with nearly U.S. $3 billion in loans for 
47 development projects and U.S. $180 million in grants for another 10 projects since 
2002. The largest of the 10 grants is the U.S. $150 million agreement made in October 
last year for the construction of a sports complex ahead of Cambodia’s turn as host of 
the Southeast Asia Games (SEA Games) in 2023. 
Beside financial and technical assistance, China is also the leading country in 
investment in the Kingdom. According to the report of the Ministry of Commerce, 
bilateral trade between China and Cambodia is expected to worth more than $5 
billion49 by 2017, up from $3.75 billion last year. In an interview with the Cambodia 
Daily, His Excellency Chhoun Dara, a secretary of state at the Ministry of Commerce, 
told a workshop on exporting products to China that the government had estimated 
                                                        




bilateral trade, which was worth $3.75 billion last year, would reach $4.21 billion this 
year.  
According to the same report, bilateral trade is expected to be worth $4.31 billion in 
2016, with trade between the two countries expected to hit the $5.01 billion mark by 
2017. This equates to a one-third increase in trade value over the next three years. Mr. 
Chhoun Dara went on saying; “In the Cambodia-Chinese Economic Trade and 
Investment 5-year plan (2013-2017), according to Cambodia and China’s cordial 
cooperation plan, Cambodia has estimated the bilateral trade volume to be worth $4.21 
billion for 2015, $4.31 billion for 2016 and $5.01 billion for 2017.”50 As China’s 
economy continues to expand, bilateral trade between Cambodia and China is likely to 
increase more quickly than trade between Cambodia and Western countries. 
c. Perspective of Cambodian Scholars and Policy-Makers 
Ear Sophal51, the author of Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance 
Undermines Democracy, said; “Chinese aid has done little to contribute to the 
sustainable development of Cambodia because the agreements lack transparency and 
fail to hold Cambodia accountable for how the money is spent.”  
Dr. Ear Sophal added, “On the surface, Cambodia maintains that it is independent. 
However, in practice, it seems obvious that Cambodia has been China’s spokesperson 
for the South China Sea since 2012. The continuation of Cambodia’s stance will be 
increasingly difficult going forward as claimant states who are members of ASEAN 
will clamor for Cambodia to stop representing China’s views.” Viewing Cambodia’s 
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position over the South China Sea as short term version he advised, “Not being a 
claimant state, it should be to support Cambodia’s national interest, whether it be to 
gain access through shipping lanes, to buy oil/gas if it is cheaper (shorter distance, 
lower transaction cost), to profit from the passage of oil/gas and other maritime 
resources, but basically to be a good member of ASEAN and support ASEAN’s 
common interests.”  
Cheunboran Chanborey, a research fellow and a PhD candidate of the Strategic and 
Defense Studies Centre, the Australian National University; defends Cambodia’s 
position on the South China Sea. He provides the projection of solving the issue 
through the existing mechanism and framework such as, (1) continuing implementing 
the declaration of conduct (DOC); (2) urging ASEAN and China to make the utmost 
effort to finalize the code of conduct (COC); and (3) encouraging countries concerned 
to discuss and resolve their issue bilaterally. 
The remark of Cambodian Prime Minister suggested that, “ASEAN cannot measure 
land for any other claimant states. The South China Sea is not an issue between 
ASEAN and China.” The claimant states should have settled the problem bilaterally 
like the way that Cambodia and Thailand dealing with Preah Vihea issue since 2008 
without asking support from other ASEAN members.”52 
Borey explained Cambodia government policy in a short-term, Phnom Penh believe 
that provisional alignment with China can be given its security and development 
objectives. For medium term, Cambodia must play a role in promoting organization’s 
centrality in Southeast Asia and be a proactive member of ASEAN. He went on 
suggesting, “Creating a good environment to strengthen its relations with other major 
powers in Asia and beyond is also an objective to consider. In a long run, Cambodia 
must adopt a self-reliant foreign policy. Being as a small state, seeking for large 
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number of friends in the region as well as in global while maintaining the freedom to 
be itself as a sovereign, independent, and prosperous nation. It is a key for Cambodia 
to ensure the equality and survival of small countries.” 
Just like other Cambodian policymakers, Borey expresses his concern over the loyalty 
of Cambodian’s neighbors mainly Thailand and Vietnam. He stated, “In the near future, 
Cambodia relation with China will depend on the foreign policy behaviors of Thailand 
and Vietnam toward Cambodia.” He added, “… Ensure that the small kingdom like 
Cambodia to survive, secure its sovereignty, and pursuit of prosperity it’s important to 
see the reaction of its neighboring countries. In any case that neighboring countries 
bring Cambodia difficulties then making alignment with powerful state like China, 
Cambodia will remain serving its own interest and safety.” 
He views Cambodian’s position is righteous, saying as a small state, getting support 
and assistance from the great powers like China and USA, is very important for 
economic development and safeguarding territorial integrity. He went on saying; China 
has played an increasingly important role in economic development of Cambodia such 
as primary trading partner, largest source of FDIs, and the top provider of development 
assistance and soft-loans. Moreover, Cambodia will benefits from new Chinese 
initiatives such as the Maritime Silk Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank when region is at peace and stable. Beside economic interest, China is the biggest 
sources of assistance to Cambodia’s military modernization. When Cambodia, for 
instance, faced an increasing border tension with Thailand over Cambodian Preah 
Vihear Temple from 2008 to 2011, China was the major military assistance to the 
improving Cambodia army’s capacity in national defense. 
The two perspectives give us different approaches over Cambodia’s nature of foreign 
policy, especially its stand toward the South China Sea issue. If we view it in the realist 
perspective, Cambodia’s stand is righteous and responsive to its geopolitical 




into Cambodian political history, its location, topography, and demographic weakness 
which have means that its history often been entangled with Thailand and Vietnam. 
“These countries, in turn and because of their size, have consistently tried to patronize 
or absorb their neighbor. Having Vietnam next door in the 1820s and 1830s led to a 
Vietnamese protectorate, and de facto Thai protectorate had been in effect at several 
points in preceding centuries.”53 It therefore might be another secure choice to ensure 
its survival and promote economic interest while at the same time maintaining regional 
peace and stability. “Given the economic, political and social changes sweeping across 
the region, it is hard to imagine that ASEAN will remain unchanged as an 
institution.”54 Promoting ASEAN interest is important and absolute goal, of course, but 
without regional peace and stability, those interests cannot be secured. The political 
and unity within ASEAN Member States is necessary, but it require sharing cost and 
turning the association against China for the interest of a few remembers seem far more 
from the rationality of the creation of ASEAN and its principles of peaceful resolution 
like the existing Declaration of Conduct (DOC) and the Code of Conduct (COC) over 
the South China Sea issue. 
The liberalist, however, also gives us considerable perspective of Cambodia’s stand 
toward this emerging issue. Resolve the South China Sea issue by the international law 
and norms is likely more civilized, but the due process and the cost of peace seem 
expensive while China itself understood the game, a game it never expected to win 
when those existing international institutions are dominated by the United States and 
its alliance, some are Chinese historical and strategic rivalries – Japan and South Korea 
– over brutal colonial rule and economic interest. The South China Sea is Chinese 
strategic survival against the American containment policy and its military based in the 
Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, to name a few. Chinese elites’ perspective which 
likely be hunted by its own old wounded when French and British soldiers stormed in 
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China in the WWII through the South China Sea. Expecting international community 
and institutions to act in line with its profession seem not rational in Chinese and the 
rest of other states’ perspective, because these organizations survive through fund 
provided by mostly the United States and its alliances, a club that not trusted by China 
and some others. And the interference of the United States into the issue will present 
challenges to regional stability rather than prosperity.  
 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
 
Cambodia has always been painted by some ASEAN hardliners and media outlets as 
the “Chinese puppet” protecting China’s interest and divide ASEAN’s unity in an 
exchanges of millions of dollars loans and investment. The accusation is naïve and so 
judgmental. If Cambodia is the Chinese puppet, then shall the Philippines and Vietnam 
are viewed as another American puppets for enjoying millions of dollars economic and 
military assistance regardless of worse human rights practices?  
ASEAN has already openly divided on how the South China Sea should be handled –
multilaterally or bilaterally – this could undermine the viability of successful pursuit of 
constructive engagement or existing framework of ASEAN like DOC and COC. 
Without the presence of the United Sates, the South China Sea issue was about to put 
into rest. But the heat is again arising when the United States switches its interest 
towards Asia, an ambition to reduce China’s influence.  
The military confrontation between ASEAN and China presents great risk of regional 
stability and economic prosperity making such move a costly and deadly strategic. 
Although ASEAN has no military power and unwilling to do so, but ASEAN Member 
States themselves shall not ignore this significant risk and had better focus on its 




others. Military confrontation and the great power rivalries between China and the 
United States will bring ASEAN to the new level of nightmare and division within its 
own created association, the development that cannot be denied or underestimated.  
The South China Sea issue cannot be resolved over night, but it needs the slow and 
determine consultation for the legal binding existing regional mechanism like the 
Declaration of Conduct (DOC) and the Code of Conduct (COC) – the guiding 
principles of peaceful resolution toward such geopolitical challenges issue. The power 
rivalries between China, not with ASEAN, with the United States present greater 
opportunity for military industry machineries to trigger the issues for the increased 
spending of ASEAN Member States’ budget on national defense making the dark age 
of arm race in ASEAN. This status quo present even much greater military 
confrontation between member states and member states of ASEAN, many of whom to 
solve territory disputes with their neighbors. These levels of insecurity and 
confrontation will not present any benefit, but costly both economically and stability of 
the region.  
Geopolitics and the strategic rivalry for influence and economic interest among China 
and the United States can only make things issues becoming worse and present great 
threats to regional peace and prosperity following ASEAN Non-interference Principal. 
Will Cambodia joining ASEAN to condemn China provide a significant improvement 
over the issue or even makes it worse? The question remains unanswered, but sadly 
Cambodia and her fellows ASEAN impoverished states have always been painted as 
“Chinese puppet” regardless of their efforts seeking for mutual trust and peaceful 











Burgess, John. TEMPLE IN THE CLOUDS: Faith and Conflict at Preah Vihear. 
Bangkok: Bangkok Printing Co., Ltd. , 2008. 
Chanborey, Cheunboran. "The South China Sea and ASEAN Unity: A Cambodian 
Perspective ." CAMBODIAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2016: 2. 
CHANDLER, DAVID. A History of CAMBODIA. Bangkok: O.S. Printing House , 2008. 
DAVISON, and J. DOSCH Eds. . The new global politics of the Asia Pacific. London: 
Routledge, 2009. 
HAYTON, BILL. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: The Struggle for Power in Asia. Hong Kong: 
World Print Ltd, 2014. 
HOURN, KAO KIM. Asean's Non-Interference Policy: Principles under Pressure? 
London: ASEAN ACADEMIC PRESS , 1998. 
"Hun Sen's Remarks at the Graduation Ceremony of the Royal School of 
Administration ." Phnom Penh Post, 2016. 
Jackson, Robert. "Introduction to International Relations: Theories and 
Approaches." New York : Oxford University Press Inc.,, 2010. 
JONES, L. "ASEAN’s unchanged melody?" The Pacific Review, 2010: 479-502. 
KAPLAN, ROBERT D. ASIA'S CAULDRON: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE END OF 
A STABLE PACIFIC. New York: David Lindroth Inc., 2014. 
Kaplan, Robert D. South China Sea: Oil and Natural Gas. Washington: Washington 
Post , 2010. 
Phanna, Seng. "The South China Sea Conflict: New Preventive Diplomacy for a 
Tension Reduction and a Possible Solution." SEOUL, 2012. 





STUBBS, R. "The ASEAN alternative? Ideas, institutions and the challenge to ‘global’ 
governance." The Pacifict Review, 2008: 451-468. 
STUDIES, CAMBODIAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC. "INDO-PACIFICT STRATEGIC 










, , ASEAN 2002
(Code of Conduct) , ASEAN 
2012




. , ASEAN 











: ( : 7-8 ): , , 
SCS , , - , SCS  
ASEAN- . 
: 2015-25112
